

Timing and Level of Pressure on Fishery-protection and Piscatorial Negotiations: Comparisons on Taiwan-Japan and Taiwan-Philippines Piscatorial Disputes

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The piscatorial disputes and conflictual claims on exclusive economic zone between Taiwan and Japan and those between Taiwan and Philippines have existed for a long time. During 17 times of negotiations, the piscatorial agreement between Taiwan and Japan has been done with the sovereignty of Diaoyu Island in abeyance. However, the agreement raises more doubts and dissatisfaction of fishermen and politicians in both countries. As for Taiwan and Philippines, the miserably cruel event which the Taiwanese captain of a fishing vessel (Guang Da Xing No. 28) was shot by a Philippine official vessel in disputed ocean has opened the door to piscatorial negotiation. However, it is still a long way to achieve consensus. This project does not plan to review Taiwan diplomacy or to analyze disputes from the perspective of international law. This project aims to examine the most important factors from the international and domestic levels in order to find out relevant countries' sensitivity of threat respectively. In such a case, this project can recommend Taiwan government on the timing to protect fishery and the level of pressure on opponents in piscatorial negotiations.

Specifically speaking, this project utilizes Boolean algebra to infer under which degree of power ratio and state dissatisfaction Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, the United States and China will initiate war. Accordingly, we can find out under which level Taiwan can pressure the opponents and related major powers in order to get maximum benefit during negotiations while avoiding war. In the level of state, this project considers audience costs as negotiation chips of state while dealing with external relations. According to the audience cost theory, audience costs can help to signal states' seriousness of requests and difficulty to compromise so that opponent states may back down. This project will test whether the two cases of Taiwan confirm this argument. Furthermore, the levels of organization are different in the two cases. In Taiwan-Japan relations, audience costs (claiming the sovereignty of Diaoyu Island) are well-organized and exist for a long time while audience costs in Taiwan-Philippines case suddenly erupt due to the miserable event. Comparing the differences of audience costs in the two cases can contribute to academic research and to the real world by suggesting governments

how to utilize and respond to audience costs in the future.

In sum, this project combines theory and practical experience. In order to produce valid policy suggestion and reference for governments, we explore how governments can credibly pressure the opponents during negotiations with domestic audience supports meanwhile the level of pressure will not evoke war in regions. This project also contributes to academia on theory-verifying and data-complementing. After update the International Crisis behavior dataset, this project is able to examine whether the revised power transition theory works and how it argues the sensitivity of threats of Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, the United States, and China. Moreover, this project will interview relevant officials and civilians and test arguments by the content analysis. The results of them will verify the popular audience costs theory. In such a case, the case study on Taiwan's audience costs will become research assets for further research and will be able to interest international practitioners and scholars to study Taiwan.